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Brexit and Scotland: Between Two Unions  
 
Nicola McEwen 
 
Abstract 
 
This article addresses the territorial dimension of the Brexit referendum and its consequences, 
especially with respect to devolution and the independence debate within Scotland. The 
convincing Scottish majority vote for Remain alongside the UK vote to leave the EU has 
exposed the difficulties in reconciling rival self-determination claims. The Brexit vote has also 
raised again the issue of Scotland’s place within the UK, and for some justifies reconsideration 
of the decision the Scottish electorate made to remain within the UK by rejecting independence 
in 2014. The article considers the explanations for the Remain vote in Scotland, and the 
reactions of the Scottish and UK Governments to the competing preferences north and south 
of the border. It argues that the ‘one nation’ nationalist rhetoric of the UK Government in the 
aftermath of the vote is at odds with the plurinational character of the United Kingdom. It 
critically examines the effects of the Brexit process to date on the influence and constitutional 
authority of the devolved institutions, while pointing to the challenges that would confront 
advocates of independence were that issue to re-emerge as the Brexit process unfolds.   
 
Keywords: Brexit, self-determination, Scotland, devolution, independence 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In September 2014, Scots voted to remain within the United Kingdom, with just over 10 
percentage points between yes and no. Less than two years after the independence referendum, 
the Scottish electorate voted by a significantly larger majority - 62% to 38% - for the UK, 
including Scotland, to remain within the European Union. In a referendum offering a binary 
choice, and against the backdrop of a heated, highly salient and divisive campaign, this was an 
impressive victory for the Remain side in Scotland. But this was not a Scottish referendum. It 
was a UK-wide referendum with a UK-wide electorate. As such, UK Government ministers 
have frequently made clear that it is the decision of the whole of the UK which must be 
respected, and the job of the UK Government alone to negotiate the UK’s departure from, and 
new relationship with, the EU. In her speech to the 2016 Conservative Party conference, 
Theresa May insisted: “Because we voted in the referendum as one United Kingdom, we will 
negotiate as one United Kingdom, and we will leave the European Union as one United 
Kingdom. There is no opt-out from Brexit” (May, 2016). From this perspective, the majority 
vote for Remain in Scotland is legally inconsequential in the face of a UK vote to leave. 
 
But what of the political consequences? In the immediate aftermath of the referendum result, 
the First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, pledged ‘to take all possible steps and explore all options 
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to give effect to how people in Scotland voted - in other words, to secure our continuing 
place in the EU and in the single market in particular’. She also immediately put the option of 
a new independence referendum on the table, insisting that the result represented 
‘a significant and a material change of the circumstances in which Scotland voted against 
independence in 2014’ (Sturgeon, 2016a). In the months following the referendum, the Scottish 
Government convened a Standing Council on Europe, chaired by Professor Anton Muscatelli, 
Principal and Vice Chancellor of the University of Glasgow, and including diplomats, 
academics, industrialists and a former European Court judge. Their deliberations led to the 
publication of Scotland’s Place in Europe, in which the Scottish Government offered what it 
called a compromise proposal to enable Scotland to remain within the single market even if the 
rest of the UK left (Scottish Government, 2016a). Following the formal rejection of that 
proposal and the triggering of Article 50, the SNP Government, with the support of the Scottish 
Greens, secured a mandate to seek a transfer of powers from the UK Government to facilitate 
an independence referendum once the terms of Brexit are known.  
 
The General Election result in June has not halted these ambitions, but the pause button has 
been pressed. The SNP won in Scotland comfortably, securing by some margin the second best 
performance in a General Election in the party’s history. However, its best performance had 
come just two years previously, and it lost ground to both the Conservatives and the Labour 
Party, both of whom made opposition to a second independence referendum central to their 
campaigns. There are, however, challenges on the road ahead, and the constitutional question 
is never far from the political agenda in Scotland. This article takes a closer look at the Brexit 
referendum vote in Scotland and its aftermath. It considers the reaction and priorities of the 
SNP Government, the responses of the UK Government, and the debates over the consequences 
of Brexit for territorial dynamics within the UK. After the losses endured by the SNP at the 
2017 General Election, the option of a new independence referendum may not be on the table, 
but it remains on a shelf and within reach should circumstances and public opinion be 
conducive.  
 
 
1. The Brexit vote in Scotland 
 
The claim that Scotland voted to remain within the EU was bolstered by the scale and breadth 
of the Remain vote. Scotland did not register the highest Remain-supporting areas – even if we 
set aside Gibraltar, seven London boroughs recorded a higher vote share for Remain than the 
city of Edinburgh, Scotland’s highest Remain-supporting local authority area (Electoral 
Commission, 2016). Nonetheless, taken collectively, Scotland delivered the biggest 
endorsement of the EU of any nation or region of the UK, with majority support for Remain in 
each of the 32 local authority counting areas (Figure 1).  
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Source: Electoral Commission, 2016 
 
The breadth of support for EU membership stands in sharp contrast to the outcome the last time 
the electorate was asked to determine the UK’s relationship with the (then) European 
Community. Although voters in Scotland (and Northern Ireland) in 1975 shared the majority 
preference of their English and Welsh counterparts for the UK to remain within the European 
Community, they did so with markedly less enthusiasm.1 Indeed, the Shetland Isles and the 
Western Isles (Eilean Siar) were the only two No-voting counting areas in the UK.  
 
There was, of course, variation in the depth of support in the 2016 referendum, ranging from 
50.1% in Moray, with just 122 votes between the Remain and Leave tallies, to just under 75% 
in the city of Edinburgh and East Renfrewshire. Indeed, Hanretty’s vote share estimates 
suggested that two Scottish parliamentary constituencies, Banff and Buchan, in the north east, 
and the Highland constituency of Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross, probably voted Leave 
(Hanretty, 2017).  
 
Aggregate-level analysis of the UK vote has pointed to demographic patterns in the Remain 
and Leave vote. Goodwin and Heath suggested that ‘Leave’ won its strongest support in areas 
of relative economic disadvantage, and whose resident populations are disproportionately 
older, less ethnically diverse, have below average levels of education, and house large numbers 
of ‘the left behind’ (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). While not altogether absent from the Scottish 
picture, these voting patterns appear weaker. Ethnicity is not a major factor shaping attitudes 
or political mobilisation, perhaps stemming from the fact that the cities of Glasgow, Edinburgh, 
Aberdeen and Dundee are the only local authority areas where, according to the 2011 census, 
the non-white resident population is above 5% (Scotland’s Census, 2016). The association with 
relative economic disadvantage is also less clear in Scotland. While less than 1% respectively 
of the 15% most deprived areas of Scotland can be found amid the relative affluence of East 
Dunbartonshire, East Renfrewshire and Stirling, and just over 5% in the City of Edinburgh – 
                                                 
1 Whereas the vote for remain in England and Wales in 1975 was 67.8% and 64.8% respectively, it was just 
58.4% in Scotland and 52.1% in Northern Ireland. 
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Figure 1: EU Referendum Vote in Scotland
% vote Remain % vote Leave
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the four counting areas with the highest support for Remain – the next highest Remain vote 
was in the city of Glasgow, which includes over 30% of the most deprived communities in 
Scotland. Conversely, none of the 15% most deprived communities are to be found in Moray, 
which turned out the highest Leave share of any of Scotland’s counting areas (derived from 
Scottish Government, 2016b). When modelling the effect of age and education on the vote, 
Goodwin and Heath found that the Leave vote in Scotland was 22 percentage points lower than 
might have been expected in light of the country’s educational and age profile (Goodwin and 
Heath, 2016: 328). 
 
Aggregate data can only paint a sketchy picture; local authority areas don’t vote, people do. 
Individual-level data from the British Election Study suggests similarities in the demographic 
characteristics of Remain and Leave voters across Britain. As Table 1 indicates, north and south 
of the border, young people, and those with University qualifications were much more likely 
to have voted Remain than older and less qualified people. But in Scotland, the gap between 
these demographic groups was narrower; among Scots, there was a 24 percentage point gap 
between the youngest and oldest age group, and a 38 percentage point gap between those with 
postgraduate degrees and those with no qualifications, compared to gaps of 32 and 48 
percentage point respectively among Remain voters in England. Indeed, what stands out from 
Table 1 is the extent to which Remain was the preference of almost every demographic in 
Scotland. 
 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics and the vote 
 Scotland England 
 Remain Leave Remain Leave 
Female 61 39 49 51 
Male 62 38 49 51 
18-25yrs 75 25 71 29 
26-35 yrs 69 31 55 45 
36-45 yrs 64 36 48 52 
46-55 yrs 54 46 43 57 
56-65 yrs 58 42 40 60 
66+ 51 49 39 61 
No qualifications 41 59 25 75 
GCSE D-G 51 49 34 66 
GCSE A-C 47 53 35 65 
A level 63 37 54 46 
Undergrad 73 27 62 38 
Postgrad 79 21 73 27 
Source: BES Wave 9, see also Henderson and Liñeira, 2017 
 
A comprehensive analysis of the vote is beyond the scope of this paper, but the BES data (wave 
9) gives some indicators. Scots appeared more favourable towards European integration than 
voters in England, and held a stronger European identity. Just over a third of Scots surveyed 
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expressed broadly positive or enthusiastic attitude towards EU integration, compared to a 
quarter of the English sample. Those most hostile to the EU accounted for half of English 
respondents compared to around a third of Scots. Just under half of Scots said they felt 
somewhat or strongly European compared to just over a third of English respondents. 
Conversely, around a third of Scots felt only a little or not at all European compared to just 
under half of the English sample (Fieldhouse, et al. 2016).2  
 
Identities and social attitudes do not develop in a vacuum. They are shaped by the societal and 
political context in which voters live. A significant part of the explanation underpinning the 
Remain vote is the absence of Europe as an issue of contention within the Scottish political 
party system and the structure of party support. Having been sceptical at the time of the 1975 
referendum, both the SNP and the Labour Party in Scotland came to embrace European 
integration in the 1980s. The increasing Euroscepticism of the Thatcher Government 
encouraged a more sympathetic re-evaluation of my enemy’s enemy, but the change of heart 
also reflected developments in the EU and Scotland’s experience of it (Mitchell, 2014: 231-
34). The internal market heightened the significance and authority of the EU across member 
states, while the simultaneous expansion of Cohesion funding and targeted EU regional policy 
helped Scottish local authorities and political parties orientate themselves more towards EU 
institutions and programmes. From 1988 and throughout the 1990s, large swathes of Scotland 
were eligible for cohesion funding as a consequence of their relative poverty, rurality or as 
areas affected by industrial decline. Investments in transport, development and infrastructure 
may have helped promote and accentuate the benefits of EU membership to a wider public. 
The European social model and the ‘Europe of the Regions’, promoted by Jacques Delors as 
Commission president, also contrasted favourably to the neo-liberal and centralist thrust of the 
Thatcher governments. As for many others within the family of sub-state nationalist parties 
(Nagel, 2004; Elias, 2009), for the SNP, which committed itself to the goal of ‘independence 
in Europe’ from 1988, the EU also provided a secure external framework and market that could 
facilitate a transition to independence and minimise the economic and security risks it might 
otherwise encounter. This reversal in attitudes towards European integration among 
nationalists and the left appears to have been mirrored by a shift in public attitudes (Henderson, 
et al., 2016: 190-94). 
 
Since then, the parties in Scotland have maintained a broad consensus on the issue of EU 
membership. The Euroscepticism that gripped the UK Conservative Party never took hold of 
the party north of the border, in part because its rise in the UK party coincided with a steep 
decline in the Tories’ electoral significance in Scotland. While a few, mainly newly elected, 
Conservative members of the Scottish Parliament campaigned for a Leave vote in the June 
                                                 
2 The BES sought attitudes towards integration by using an 11 point scale, ranging from 0 – unite fully with the 
EU – to 10 – protect our independence. I have taken scores of 0-3 as reflective of a positive attitude towards 
integration, and scores of 7-11 as a more hostile attitude. European identity is measured using a 7 point scale, 
ranging from 1 (‘not at all European’) to 7 (very strongly European). I have taken scores of 5 and above as 
indicative of feeling somewhat or strongly European, and scores of 1-3 of feeling only a little or not at all 
European.  
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referendum, no senior elected Scottish Tory supported Leave. Ruth Davidson, the Scottish 
Conservatives’ popular leader, was a prominent Remain supporter in the referendum campaign 
as was SNP leader and First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon. Scotland’s political class was thus 
united in its support for Remain. Against that backdrop, one might be forgiven for expressing 
surprise that over a million Scots voted Leave. 
 
 
2. When Two National Projects Collide 
 
National self-determination – expressed in the UN Covenant as the right of ‘peoples’ to ‘freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’ (UN, 1976, Part 1, Article 1) – has long been recognised, at least among scholars, 
as an ‘idealistic element of state formation’ (Danspeckgruber, 2002: 2) rather than a sound 
organising principle. Notwithstanding that every concept within the aforementioned right to 
self-determination has been contested (Tesón, 2016), we focus here on the concepts of ‘people’ 
and ‘political status’. The concept of ‘a people’ is often synonymous with ‘a nation’ as the 
basis of solidarity and locus of sovereignty (Greenfeld, 1992: 4-9; Connor, 1994: 94-5), but 
determining who or what constitutes a nation, and who doesn’t, is no less ambiguous. Contrary 
to some beliefs, nations are not primordial communities but are socially constructed over time 
and, while many may share some cultural or linguistic characteristics, migration and cultural 
plurality make these insufficient criteria of nationhood. A shared national identity and mutual 
sense of belonging - captured in Benedict Anderson’s (1991) celebrated definition of nations 
as ‘imagined political communities’ – overcomes the limitations of objective criteria. Ernest 
Renan’s equally celebrated essay Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, originally published in 1882, 
underlined the importance of shared solidarity, built on the collective myths of a shared past 
and a shared commitment from those within a political community to continue living together, 
with all of the sacrifices that may entail. His metaphor of a nation as ‘un plebiscite de tous les 
jours’ to underline the importance of consent may be especially apt when considered alongside 
the UK’s recent referendum experiences (Renan, 1882).  
 
Among constitutional scholars, there is less ambiguity over the concept of ‘political status’, 
which is usually interpreted as international political status, and the idea that a nation, or people 
(however defined) can decide whether they should remain with the parent state, join another 
state, or seek independence (Tesón, 2016: 6). One of the many problems associated with 
recognising and implementing the right to national self-determination is that national 
boundaries often overlap, which can lead to divergent political objectives and competing 
expressions of self-determination. Brexit has shone a light on two distinctive cases of self-
determination in the UK which are difficult to reconcile. 
 
The UK is relatively unusual in the international community for the extent to which it has given 
recognition both to the plurinational character of the state and the right of nations within it to 
self-determination. This is especially evident in the case of Scotland. The Anglo-Scottish 
‘Union’ centralised political power in the Westminster Parliament but preserved distinctive 
Scottish institutions which, over time, would become carriers of national identity which helped 
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preserve and nurture the Scottish nation alongside the British nation. The state resisted giving 
recognition to Scottish national identity in a separate parliament and government until the 
development of Scottish nationalism in the late 20th century demanded a constitutional 
response, but even ardent Unionists and anti-devolutionists recognised on some level 
Scotland’s right to self-determination. As Margaret Thatcher noted of Scotland in her memoirs: 
‘As a nation, they have an undoubted right to national self-determination; thus far they have 
exercised that right by joining and remaining in the Union. Should they determine on 
independence no English party or politician would stand in their way, however much we might 
regret their departure’ (Thatcher, 1993: 624). That historic recognition may help to explain why 
David Cameron, when confronted by the election of a majority SNP Government in 2011, 
immediately recognised its right to hold an independence referendum in line with its manifesto 
commitment to do so. Over the subsequent 18 months, the two governments negotiated ‘the 
Edinburgh Agreement’, which temporarily transferred constitutional authority to the Scottish 
Parliament to facilitate a legal referendum, and committed both governments to respect the 
outcome of the referendum, whatever it may be (HM Government/Scottish Government, 2012).  
 
Although the issue of EU membership was a feature of the independence referendum 
campaign, it was not a debate on the merits of membership. Rather, the issue concerned whether 
or not an independent Scotland would be excluded from the EU, and whether an accession 
process would be long, drawn-out and carry obligations to adopt the Euro and Schengen 
Agreement. The desirability of being part of the EU was largely uncontested. The No vote in 
2014 was an expression of Scottish self-determination – voters freely determined that their 
political status should be to remain part of the United Kingdom. But the UK they voted to 
remain part of was a member of the European Union. The Brexit referendum was thus presented 
by the Scottish First Minister in the immediate aftermath of the vote as ‘a significant and a 
material change in the circumstances in which Scotland voted against independence in 2014’, 
claiming that ‘for many people the supposed guarantee of remaining in the EU was a driver in 
their decision to vote to stay within the UK’ (Sturgeon, 2016a). Independent analyses of the 
independence referendum vote points toward some evidence to suggest that the contested issue 
of EU membership influenced voting behaviour, but this issue mattered much less than 
uncertainty over the economy and the currency (Liñeira, et al., 2016: 176-82).  
 
The Brexit referendum can also be characterised as an expression of self-determination. The 
central claim of the Leave campaign was the demand to ‘take back control’ – a quintessential 
articulation of a nationalist demand for self-government. This resonated among voters 
concerned about control over borders and immigration, and the effect of the EU on Britain’s 
independence (Swales, 2016). Indeed, since accepting the outcome of the referendum, the UK 
Government has embraced the rhetoric of sovereignty and control. The Prime Minister’s 
Lancaster House speech, where she first set out her priorities for Brexit, characterised the 
referendum outcome as ‘a vote to restore, as we see it, our parliamentary democracy, national 
self-determination, and to become even more global and internationalist in action and in spirit’ 
(HM Government, 2017a). Her letter to Donald Tusk, which triggered the Article 50 process, 
reiterated the description of the vote as a desire ‘to restore, as we see it, our national self-
determination’ (HM Government, 2017b).  
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This begs the question as to which nation, which people, she is referring. For Theresa May and 
the UK Government, it is the UK, as a whole, that has freely determined that its political status, 
its political destiny, is to be outside of the EU. That presupposes a shared national solidarity 
among the citizens of the UK that can transcend the territorial (and class and age) divisions 
between them. While this is possible - there is nothing inherently contradictory about feeling 
Scottish and British at the same time - it can’t be taken for granted in a plurinational state when 
the will of the majority community runs counter to the will of territorial minorities. Moreover, 
the Brexit result presents most clearly as an expression of English self-determination than 
British self-determination. Henderson et al. (2016) found that, across England, negative 
attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership and an inclination to support Brexit was felt most 
keenly among those with a relatively strong or exclusively English identity (see also Swales, 
2016; Clarke et al., 2017, offer a more qualified view of the importance of national identity). 
 
The pro-Remain consensus within the Scottish political elite on the issue of EU membership 
does not imply consensus over how to deal with the prospect of Brexit. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Brexit referendum, the Scottish Parliament gave its backing to the First 
Minister to negotiate with the UK Government, EU institutions and member states ‘to explore 
options for protecting Scotland’s relationship with the EU, Scotland’s place in the single 
market and the social, employment and economic benefits that come from that’ (Scottish 
Parliament, 2016). But the deep constitutional fissure that dominates Scottish politics – the 
debate between Independence and Union – soon came to the fore.  
 
Contributions to the debate by Scottish party leaders reveal how the boundaries of the political 
community – the boundaries of the demos – are contested within Scotland. The Scottish 
Conservative leader, Ruth Davidson, urged the Scottish Government to preserve the integrity 
of ‘the UK internal market’ and to commit to ‘making the best of Brexit’, by respecting both 
the UK-wide result in the Brexit referendum and the 2014 independence referendum: ‘The 
2016 referendum was a UK wide vote… As democrats, it behoves us to respect both 
(referendum results)’ (Davidson, 2016). Following the Scottish Government’s formal request 
to the UK Government for a new agreement that could facilitate a new independence 
referendum, Davidson made opposition to an independence referendum her central platform, 
with evident electoral benefits in the election that followed soon after. The then Labour leader, 
Kezia Dugdale, called for a solution that meets the demands of the Scottish electorate ‘To be 
part of the UK and with a close and abiding relationship with Europe’, thus implicitly giving 
more weight to the 2014 referendum outcome than the 2016 vote (Dugdale, 2016). Contrast 
this with the Scotland-centred expression of self-determination presented by Nicola Sturgeon: 
‘we didn’t vote to leave – we voted to remain. To be told that we have to leave, regardless, is 
tantamount to being told that our voice as a nation doesn’t matter’ (Sturgeon, 2016b). To those 
for whom the boundaries of political community lie around Scotland, the Scottish demos will 
always take precedence.   
 
3. Negotiating Brexit 
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The Prime Minister’s first official visit following her appointment was to Edinburgh for a 
formal meeting with the Scottish First Minister. That was a symbolic gesture, intended to 
provide reassurance that the Scottish Government and the other devolved administrations 
would be engaged in the discussions around Brexit. It came with a promise that the PM 
wouldn’t trigger Article 50 ‘until I think that we have a UK approach and objectives for 
negotiations’ (BBC, 2016). This was followed by an intensification of formal and informal 
engagement between the UK and devolved governments. The Joint Ministerial Committee 
(JMC), the main forum for bringing together the leaders of the UK’s four governments, was 
resurrected in its plenary format after a hiatus of two and half years. A new sub-committee – 
the JMC (EU Negotiations) – was established specifically to provide the devolved governments 
with an opportunity to engage with the negotiation process, discuss their requirements of the 
future UK-EU relationship, and to ‘seek to agree’ a UK approach to Article 50 negotiations 
(Joint Ministerial Committee, 2016). However, the commitment to securing a UK approach 
was short-lived, and this first phase of Brexit exposed fundamental weaknesses in the 
machinery and culture of the UK’s intergovernmental relations (McEwen, 2017). 
 
The Scottish Government, along with the Welsh Government, prioritised remaining within the 
EU single market and customs union (Scottish Government, 2016a; Welsh Government, 2017). 
If the UK were to leave the single market, the Scottish Government proposed that Scotland 
could remain within it, through separate continued inclusion within the EEA. Clearly, the 
prospect of Scotland remaining more closely embedded within the single market than England 
and Wales would raise considerable practical and legal difficulties, for example, around the 
legal status of Scotland in the international community and the free movement of money, 
goods, services and people across two separate markets. Unsurprisingly, the proposal was 
formally rejected by the UK Government. The failure of the JMC (EN) process, though, was 
more evident in the inability of the devolved governments to have any influence over shaping 
a ‘UK approach’ to Brexit. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech, which 
effectively ruled out remaining within the single market and the Customs Union, was delivered 
without consultation with the devolved governments. Likewise, the Article 50 letter was 
apparently not discussed with the devolved governments prior to its publication; indeed, the 
Scottish Minister for UK Negotiations on Scotland's Place in Europe, claimed to have only 
found out that notification was to be given to the President of the European Council when it 
was reported on the BBC.3 
 
The European Union has provided a discursive framework for the expression of multiple 
identities and self-determination claims within the UK, as well as a regulatory framework 
within which the UK’s system of multi-level government has developed. The overlap between 
EU and devolved competences has necessitated intergovernmental cooperation within the UK; 
notably the only intra-UK intergovernmental forum which has met regularly since devolution 
                                                 
3 In a tweet on 20 March at 12.17pm, he tweeted from his personal Twitter feed @feorlean: Thank 
you @BBCNews for letting JMC members like me know that #Article50 is to be triggered next 
week. @GOVUK somehow forgot to inform us. 
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to the relative satisfaction of the participating governments is the JMC (Europe), which 
discusses upcoming issues on the European Council agenda. The need for the UK and the 
devolved governments to comply with EU law has represented a centripetal force containing 
some policy and regulatory divergences that institutional and political pressures may have 
otherwise generated. The UK Government appears to have belatedly recognized this in its 
intention that, in leaving the EU and leaving the EU single market, ‘no new barriers to living 
and doing business within our own Union are created… That means maintaining the necessary 
common standards and frameworks for our own domestic market’ (May, 2017). 
 
The EU (Withdrawal) Bill is the first indication of that intention. Its primary function is to 
repeal the European Communities Act 1972, while preserving existing EU law in order to 
ensure continuity and certainty as the UK exits the EU. The Bill achieves this by creating a 
new category of law - retained EU law - and gives powers to ministers to use secondary 
legislation to modify it in order to ‘prevent, remedy or mitigate’ any deficiencies. However, it 
is the provisions of the Bill that relate to devolution, and their underlying assumptions, which 
pose the biggest challenge for UK territorial politics. At time of writing, the Bill is progressing 
through the Committee stage in the Commons, and its fate is as yet unknown. In its current 
form, however, it represents a significant challenge to the constitutional authority of the 
devolved governments and the devolved legislatures.  
 
The legislation that created the devolved institutions required devolved laws to be compatible 
with EU law. In the absence of any other change, this requirement would be removed after 
Brexit, leaving these legislatures free to pass laws in devolved areas like agriculture, the 
environment and fishing that have been governed by EU law. This would give rise to the 
possibility of greater policy and regulatory divergence in these fields. However, Clause 11 of 
the Bill replaces the need for compatibility with EU law with the need for compatibility with 
‘retained EU law’, and at the same time stipulates that the devolved legislatures ‘cannot 
modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law’. These 
restrictions are intended to be transitional. There is provision in the Bill to transfer further 
powers to the devolved legislatures, that is, to release them from the new constraint, if 
negotiations between the UK and devolved governments determine that a common legislative 
approach isn’t necessary. For their part, the devolved governments have signalled a willingness 
to develop common frameworks where necessary, so long as this is achieved by agreement. 
But if agreement can’t be reached, the default position created by the Bill would leave authority 
for retained EU law with the UK Government and Parliament. In that event, the devolved 
legislatures may not have fewer powers, in practice, than they have today, but the balance of 
authority between them and the UK Parliament would have shifted considerably. The Bill also 
gives devolved ministers some time-limited powers to modify retained EU law in areas that are 
already fully devolved. These come with the restriction that any changes made by the devolved 
institutions must be consistent with modifications made by the UK Government. Also implicit 
within the Bill is that the latter may use secondary legislation to alter the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales (but not the Northern Ireland Assembly) 
without requiring the consent of devolved ministers or legislatures.  
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The Scottish SNP Government and Welsh Labour Government, in a coordinated response, have 
criticised the bill as a ‘power grab’ that will weaken their respective devolution settlements. It 
remains to be seen whether ongoing intergovernmental deliberations can reach a compromise 
position which would enable them to recommend to their respective legislatures that the Bill 
be given legislative consent for the changes it will make to devolved powers. Such consent is 
sought by convention - it is not a legal requirement. As the Supreme Court made clear when 
ruling on the devolution issues raised in the Brexit appeal, this convention, commonly known 
as the Sewel Convention, acts as ‘a political restriction on the activity of the UK Parliament’ 
which serves to promote harmonious relationships with the devolved legislatures, ‘but the 
policing of its scope and the manner of its operation does not lie within the constitutional remit 
of the judiciary, which is to protect the rule of law’ (The  Supreme Court, 2017: paras 145 and 
151; for a discussion of the devolution dimension of the Brexit appeal, see McHarg and 
Mitchell, 2017). If consent is withheld, politics, not law, will determine what happens next.  
 
Conclusion: A Choice of Two Unions?   
 
In her foreword to Scotland’s Place in Europe, Nicola Sturgeon warned that: ‘If the real and 
substantial risks that Brexit poses to Scotland’s interests cannot be mitigated within the UK, 
the option of choosing a better future through independence should be open to the Scottish 
people’ (Scottish Government, 2016a: viii). With the support of SNP and Green MSPs, she 
secured a mandate from the Scottish Parliament to formally request a section 30 order from the 
UK Government to facilitate a new independence referendum. The motion read: ‘That the 
Parliament acknowledges the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of 
government best suited to their needs’, and it called for the powers to legislate for a referendum 
‘that will give the people of Scotland a choice over the future direction and governance of their 
country’, setting a timescale of between autumn 2018 and spring 2019, when the terms of 
Brexit are clear but before exit day (Scottish Parliament, 2017). Sturgeon’s subsequent letter 
to the Prime Minister invoked the right of the Scottish people to self-determination and the 
right of the people of Scotland ‘to determine the form of government most suited to their 
needs’. She also noted purposefully ‘the importance you attached to the principle of self-
determination in your letter to President Tusk.’ (Scottish Government, 2017). The Prime 
Minister’s carefully crafted rejection of the request, on the basis that ‘now is not the time’ for 
an independence referendum, translated into a more forceful opposition in the snap UK General 
Election. The SNP lost 21 seats in that election, and a combination of opposition to, or lack of 
appetite for, another referendum has been widely interpreted as one explanation, though it is 
among others (see Henderson and Mitchell, 2017). Nonetheless, the SNP Government’s 
independence referendum plans have been put on hold.  
 
These are, however, deeply uncertain times and support for independence remains historically 
high. The political circumstances may yet become more conducive to a new independence vote. 
If they do, the architects of independence will be forced to confront some complex and difficult 
issues over the kind of independent Scotland they could deliver within the context of Brexit. 
The independence vision presented in 2014 was predicated on both Scotland and the UK 
remaining within the EU, and envisaged many shared institutional, political and economic ties 
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with the rest of the UK, including a formal currency union, a strategic energy partnership, 
continuity of the Common British Isles Travel Area, a common research area, and defence and 
security co-operation. Brexit, especially where it entails withdrawal from the EU single market 
and Customs Union, would make it difficult to combine such an interdependent form of 
independence with Scottish membership of the EU or even of the EEA or EFTA. As is evident 
in the issues surrounding the border on the island of Ireland, it would raise the spectre of a 
‘hard border’ between Scotland and England which would almost certainly make independence 
less palatable.  
 
The outcome of the Brexit process remains unclear, both with respect to the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU, and the domestic implications of withdrawal. What happens next 
may depend as much on the actions, reactions and discourse of the UK Government as to 
developments within Scotland. Can Theresa May’s government survive, and can it secure in a 
plebiscite de tous les jours the consent and legitimacy to speak for the whole of the UK? Can 
it secure a deal with the EU which enables Brexit to appear as an opportunity not a threat? Will 
it respect Scottish distinctiveness and the devolution settlement by making some concessions, 
for example, by loosening the constraints on the devolution settlement and transferring 
sufficient additional powers to the Scottish Parliament and the other devolved legislatures? If 
the answer to one or more of these questions is ‘No’, we can expect further challenges to the 
UK’s territorial constitution. A new independence referendum may seem less likely today than 
it did a year ago, but it remains a possibility. If that happens, Scots may be confronted with a 
choice few wanted to have to make: a choice between remaining within the UK Union or 
seeking a future within the European Union.  
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